1: Big news this month as Johann Danzl’s group at the Institute of Science and Technology Austria released their work on light-microscopy based connectomics, a new technology that enables dense reconstruction of brain circuitry with light microscopy at synaptic resolution.
Can you please explain thinking behind #17 comment: "...worse-than-death outcome could possibly want to have children or encourage others to. And if everyone stops having children, then what happens to humanity?" Just confused why this was added! Thanks.
Good question. My point was that by the same logic, one could argue against having children, since bringing a new life into the world carries a similar risk of extremely negative outcomes for that individual. Yet most people consider that small risk acceptable and worthwhile given the potential benefits.
I was trying to highlight what I see as an inconsistency - that some use the small chance of a very bad personal outcome as an argument against cryonics, but don't apply the same reasoning to argue against having children, even though creating new life also imposes suffering risks on the individual being born.
The comment about everyone stopping having children was meant to illustrate a potential flaw in always avoiding actions with any chance of producing suffering. Taken to an extreme, that principle could lead to the end of humanity. I was arguing that many might view some risks acceptable for the sake of potential large benefits.
The refusal to consider harm vs benefit trade-offs is one of the key insights I took away from reading philosopher David Benatar's book "Better Never to Have Been" that advocates anti-natalism, the view that it is morally wrong to have children. Benatar argues that even if a life has much more happiness than suffering, the mere presence of some suffering means it would have been better for that individual to have never been born.
I see some parallels between this view and the argument that any possibility of a bad personal outcome, no matter how unlikely, is sufficient reason to reject cryonics. I realize this is a potentially controversial perspective that many might disagree with, but it's something I always think about when this topic is raised.
Although I have plenty of disagreements with Benatar, including anti-natalism as a whole, in fairness to him he is anti-death and has stated clearly that he sees death as an evil thing and a harm. Sarah Perry, who was influenced by Benatar, expands upon this in her book *Every Cradle is a Grave* and even mentions being pro-cryonics as a form of body autonomy, while still being anti-natalist.
Benatar's view seems inconsistent. I suppose I would have to read his work to figure it out. It's worse to exist than to not exist but death is also bad. Hmm.
Can you please explain thinking behind #17 comment: "...worse-than-death outcome could possibly want to have children or encourage others to. And if everyone stops having children, then what happens to humanity?" Just confused why this was added! Thanks.
Good question. My point was that by the same logic, one could argue against having children, since bringing a new life into the world carries a similar risk of extremely negative outcomes for that individual. Yet most people consider that small risk acceptable and worthwhile given the potential benefits.
I was trying to highlight what I see as an inconsistency - that some use the small chance of a very bad personal outcome as an argument against cryonics, but don't apply the same reasoning to argue against having children, even though creating new life also imposes suffering risks on the individual being born.
The comment about everyone stopping having children was meant to illustrate a potential flaw in always avoiding actions with any chance of producing suffering. Taken to an extreme, that principle could lead to the end of humanity. I was arguing that many might view some risks acceptable for the sake of potential large benefits.
The refusal to consider harm vs benefit trade-offs is one of the key insights I took away from reading philosopher David Benatar's book "Better Never to Have Been" that advocates anti-natalism, the view that it is morally wrong to have children. Benatar argues that even if a life has much more happiness than suffering, the mere presence of some suffering means it would have been better for that individual to have never been born.
I see some parallels between this view and the argument that any possibility of a bad personal outcome, no matter how unlikely, is sufficient reason to reject cryonics. I realize this is a potentially controversial perspective that many might disagree with, but it's something I always think about when this topic is raised.
Apparently David Benatar is putting off terminating his own existence because of a burning need to persuade others that it's better not to exist.
Although I have plenty of disagreements with Benatar, including anti-natalism as a whole, in fairness to him he is anti-death and has stated clearly that he sees death as an evil thing and a harm. Sarah Perry, who was influenced by Benatar, expands upon this in her book *Every Cradle is a Grave* and even mentions being pro-cryonics as a form of body autonomy, while still being anti-natalist.
Benatar's view seems inconsistent. I suppose I would have to read his work to figure it out. It's worse to exist than to not exist but death is also bad. Hmm.
Arthur Caplan is better than many bioethicists but, on this topic, he's no more able to think without blinkers than the rest.